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This Europol product is descriptive and oriented towards explaining the current crime situation providing an 
overview of all relevant factors (OCGs, criminal markets, and geographical dimension).
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◊ Organised crime groups (OCGs) involved in the trafficking of human beings (THB) tend 
to work independently from other groups and launder their own criminal proceeds with 
little use of experts.
◊ OCGs are mainly small and based on family and ethnic ties. The family cell is used to 
support trafficking operations and money laundering activities.
◊ OCGs are expanding their scope of activities internationally but still use low-cost business 
models. 
◊ There are no new methods of money laundering specific to THB groups, but the exploitation 
of innovative technologies is increasing.
◊ OCGs augmented their use of cash to send money back to their countries of origin, as an 
alternative to increasingly controlled banking systems. 
◊ Victims are increasingly used by traffickers for criminal purposes, such as begging, benefit 
fraud, identity fraud, credit fraud and insurance fraud.
◊ Financial institutions, Money Service Businesses (MSBs) and other types of financial 
providers are most at risk to be exploited by the money laundering activities of OCGs. 
◊ Legal Business Structures (LBS) - either owned outright by the OCG or unwittingly infiltrated 
- can be used as a way to launder the proceeds of trafficking activities. 
All OCGs need to launder the proceeds of 
their activities. As shown in Figure 1, the 
money laundering process typically consists 
of three phases: placement, layering and 
integration. Money derived from criminal 
activities is placed into the legitimate 
financial system, moved among several 
recipients internationally (e.g. personal or 
business accounts) and then returned to the 
criminal group from seemingly legitimate 
sources.
 
3. MONEY LAUNDERING AND  
FINANCIAL INVESTIGATIONS
In most cases, THB related criminal proceeds 
are placed into the financial system through 
deposits or cash delivery to MSBs, and then 
layered either via the mainstream banking 
system or via MSBs. These transfers are 
a valuable source of information on the 
processes used by THB groups to launder 
their money. They indicate who is sending 
money, how much, how often, from where, 
and to whom. In that sense, the financial 
investigation of proceeds from THB can be 
a very useful tool to identify the supporting 
financial structures of OCGs, to disrupt THB 
networks and to confiscate THB proceeds. 
The analysis of financial transfers between 
individuals makes it possible to identify the 
main senders and receivers of money within 
a given period, allowing for the identification 
Figure 1. The money laundering process
2. INTRODUCTION
Organised crime groups involved in THBi 
have successfully combined illicit practices 
with strong business and technical skills. This 
makes them highly profitable, low risk and 
resilient to law enforcement actions. Their 
evolution into a professionalised and flexible 
service represents a growing challenge for EU 
law enforcement agencies (LEAs). In addition 
to the robust business model established by 
THB OCGs, there is a significant intelligence 
gap amongst LEAs regarding the financial 
aspects of THB. It is often unclear how much 
profit traffickers make, how proceeds are 
laundered and where they are invested. 
This partial knowledge base is a direct 
consequence of the limited amount of 
financial investigations conducted into THB 
proceeds, and in turn results in difficulties 
identifying and prosecuting OCGs involved 
in THB. 
The basis for this report lays in several 
key documents, including the UN Palermo 
Protocol (2000)ii, the EU Anti-Trafficking 
Directive (2011)iii, and the EU Strategy 
towards the Eradication of THB (2012-
2016)1. They establish that a comprehensive, 
integrated and more effective European 
anti-trafficking policy is required in order 
to increase the existing knowledge on THB. 
1  European Union: 
European Commission, 
Communication from 
the Commission to the 
European Parliament, 
the Council, the 
European Economic 
and Social Committee 
and the Committee of 
Regions. The EU Strategy 
towards the Eradication 
of Trafficking in Human 
Beings 2012-2016, 19 
June 2012, Com (2012) 
286 final. 
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of core members and associates of OCGs. 
This tool enables law enforcement to 
determine the relationships between OCG 
members, and provides new lines of enquiry 
by identifying links between suspects and 
persons previously unknown to investigators.
The financial analysis of money transfers by 
an OCG may result in the following findings:
1. The largest amounts of money are sent by 
persons associated with the main members 
of the OCG. 
2. Senders include women carrying out 
multiple transactions on a frequent basis. 
They can either be victims sending their 
income, or associates of the OCG who collect 
and send money from victims. 
3. Some individuals only receive money and 
show no record of sending money to others. 
They could be holding a leadership position 
within the group or be acting as a money 
mule, withdrawing the money and handing 
cash to other members. 
4. MONEY FLOWS WITHIN OCGS
As mentioned above, financial investigations 
can provide law enforcement with a clearer 
picture of how a THB OCG works through the 
analysis of money flows among members 
and external associates. This section will 
demonstrate how THB OCGs are structured 
at the financial level. In particular, it will 
show how criminal proceeds are moved 
by OCG members between the country of 
exploitation and the country of origin.
 
4.1. The profit from trafficking
Based on the information available to Europol, 
it is challenging to estimate the overall profits 
derived from THB activities in the EU. Some 
Member State (MS) contributions do provide 
assessments of profit, but in most cases the 
data is incomplete and lacks a consistent 
methodology for calculation. This makes 
any estimate of THB profits extremely 
unreliable. However, open sources provide 
some assessments of the possible scale of 
the profit derived from THB globally.  In 2005, 
the ILO2 estimated that the yearly profits of 
THB in the world exceed EUR 29.4 billion3. 
No evaluation of profits derived from THB 
activities in the EU specifically is available. 
Yet open sources reported on parts of the 
phenomenon, estimating the profits of 
sexual exploitation in the EU and developed 
economies to reach EUR 23.5 billion4.
When analysing profits from THB, it is 
important to bear in mind that traffickers 
operate across both licit and illicit economies. 
This intermingling of activities is especially 
evident in cases of labour exploitation, which 
may take place as a complement to legal 
activities. Regarding sexual exploitation, 
victims may have valid residency and work 
permits while they work in substandard 
conditions and are forced to give their 
income to traffickers. 
4.2. International dimension
THB OCGs active within the EU appear to be 
relatively small in size and consist of 3 to 15 
persons, active within larger loose networks 
of groups and individuals. They are organised 
in independent, though connected clusters 
2 International Labour 
Organisation  
3 ILO (2005) Forced 
Labour and Human 
Trafficking: Estimating 
the Profits, Working 
Paper No. 4 
4  ILO (2014) Profits and 
Poverty: The Economics 
of Forced Labour 
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that are spread across countries of origin and 
exploitation. There is no systematic structure 
regarding the allocation of tasks among OCG 
members. 
Organised crime groups make efficient use 
of smurfing techniques5 by sending money 
to a substantial number of people in order to 
blur the links between them, or by avoiding 
the placement of large sums into the system 
in order to evade Customer Due Diligence 
(CDD) and suspicious transactions reporting 
requirements. People who receive the 
money in the country of origin are either 
family members or low-level criminals. In 
the country of exploitation, money is not 
only sent by financial associates but also by 
victims who have taken on responsibilities 
such as collecting money from fellow victims 
and sending it to intermediaries. The OCG 
benefits from contact points: criminals who 
are not directly related to the OCG but are 
used to facilitate the money laundering 
process due to their apparent lack of kinship 
or ethnic connection.
4.3. Structure and roles
Although roles tend to be allocated to 
different OCG members depending on their 
skills, place in the hierarchy and location, 
they are often interchangeable within the 
group. 
The involvement of family and ethnically 
linked clusters and the use of victims as 
trusted criminal associates facilitate the 
smooth running of THB operations. Family 
members are involved in several aspects of 
the THB financial business model, including 
the transfer and withdrawal of money, the 
creation of multiple bank accounts and the 
ownership of legal businesses.
5. MODI OPERANDI
The laundering of criminal proceeds is a 
major activity for THB OCGs. Only a small 
number of groups display no mechanisms 
to launder the money earned through their 
illegal activities. The following sections 
describe several modi operandi used to place, 
layer and integrate criminal proceeds into the 
legitimate banking system or economy.
5.1. The banking system
OCGs exploit the legitimate banking system 
to launder criminal proceeds by setting up 
accounts using false or fraudulent identity 
documents or by using front men and 
lookalikes. The accounts may be set up 
by relatives or fictitious persons and then 
closed after some time, or replaced by new 
accounts in order to avoid raising suspicion. 
Investing in the legitimate market is an 
attractive method for OCGs to launder their 
money as it lends legitimacy to the funds, 
allows for global and secure transfers and 
provides opportunities for additional profits.
 5.2. Money Service Businesses
Money Service Businesses and postal services 
are the most widely used modus operandi 
for laundering the proceeds from THB.  The 
size of transfers can vary significantly. 
MSBs specialise in receiving cash in one 
country and paying out the equivalent 
amount at any given location almost 
instantaneously. These businesses operate 
globally and provide fast and cheap services 
with no limit on the amount or the frequency 
of transfers, making them highly attractive to 
OCGs. Services that are transaction-based, 
5 See section 5.2
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as opposed to the account-based services 
of the regular banking system, retain few 
details about customers. This makes it very 
difficult to assess whether activities appear 
unusual compared to a customer’s standard 
behaviour.
Criminals can abuse MSBs in the following 
ways:
1. Smurfing - This practice refers to the 
use of a large number of persons to 
break significant amounts of cash into 
smaller amounts. These amounts may 
be deposited on several bank accounts 
or even transmitted via MSBs, as they 
are below the threshold requiring an in 
depth identification of the customer. 
Through the use of multiple senders 
and/or receivers, large sums of cash can 
be transferred overseas to the desired 
location without raising suspicion. The 
use of straw men or intermediaries is an 
effective countermeasure which obscures 
the links between criminals and financial 
intermediaries,   allowing the smurfing 
of funds. 
2. False documents - Customer Due 
Diligence carried out by financial 
institutions is strictly regulated.  MSBs 
located in the EU are required to 
identify their customers, but any form 
of photographic identification is sufficient 
to transfer amounts below a specified 
threshold. OCGs can circumvent these 
requirements using false documents.  In 
some cases, traffickers with direct control 
over a victim will use their identity details 
for fraudulent money transfers. 
5.3. The movement of cash
There is evidence to suggest that OCGs are 
increasingly using cash as the primary means 
of laundering their proceeds. Advances in 
technology enabling the tracing of online 
transactions coupled with stricter regimes for 
recording and reporting suspicious transfers 
have compelled OCGs to depend on cash 
to launder their profits. Unlike electronic 
money transfers, it is difficult to ascertain the 
source of cash, its purpose and its intended 
beneficiary. A large number of EU MS are 
required to demonstrate the link between 
the funds and the predicate offence in order 
to prosecute money laundering offences. 
The physical movement of cash across 
borders is a common method of laundering 
money. Cash couriers are generally used 
to carry large amounts of money across 
borders, either overland (e.g. concealed 
in vehicle parts) or by air. In some cases, 
border controls have shown that traffickers 
transport cash and victims at the same time. 
In some instances, OCGs move cash using 
the services of a money mule. A distinction 
must be drawn between money mules, 
who are used to transfer criminal proceeds 
electronically on behalf of others, and cash 
couriers, who physically carry cash across 
borders. 
One increasingly observed trend is the use of 
victims to transfer or move criminal proceeds 
electronically or physically on behalf of OCG 
members. This is done through coercion, 
where they are forced to carry out money 
transfers or through employment scams 
where victims believe they are working for 
legitimate companies. 
5.4. Legal Business Structures
A large part of OCGs involved in THB activities 
own legal businesses, either in the country of 
exploitation or in the country of origin. OCGs 
are mostly involved in the entertainment 
sector, but also in sectors like restaurant 
and catering, retail and small businesses, 
production and trade, construction, vehicle 
rent and retail and recruitment agencies. 
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Cash-intensive businesses such as catering 
and retail provide a good cover for the 
source of otherwise inexplicable quantities 
of cash. These businesses can be exploited 
in a variety of ways by OCGs, but in most 
cases they are used as a legitimate source 
of income from customers to facilitate 
the commingling of illicit funds with licit 
proceeds. Many businesses use the services 
of a complicit bookkeeper or accountant 
in order to legitimise criminal cash flows 
through false invoices, receipts and accounts. 
Once laundered, proceeds are transferred 
back to OCG members via business accounts 
on the pretext of subsidising activities or as 
management fees. 
Several additional laundering methods are 
worth mentioning: 
1. Purchase of real estate in the name of off 
shore companies;
2. Reinvestment of paid dividends in the 
company; 
3. Crediting OCG-owned LBSs and later 
taking out cash to account for the credit 
contracts; 
4. Establishment of trading operations 
without any economic basis; 
5. Overvaluation or bogus real estate 
investment; 
6. Purchase of several companies and 
loans to its administrators at usurious 
rates. Administrators are then used 
as intermediaries to launder criminal 
proceeds and the companies are made 
bankrupt; and
7. Trade-based money laundering, where 
OCGs take advantage of the freedom 
of movement of goods and people in 
the Schengen area to convert criminal 
proceeds into legal goods that are then 
traded across international borders. 
Part of the laundered money which is sent to 
the country of origin of the traffickers tends 
to be returned to the country of exploitation 
in order to cover the running costs. For 
instance, vehicles and accommodation 
are rented and food and commodities are 
bought to meet the daily needs of exploited 
victims. Legal business structures can also 
be specifically obtained for the purpose of 
exploitation, such as bars which can be used 
to advertise victims’ services and launder 
proceeds.
 
5.5. Informal Value Transfer Systems
Informal Value Transfer Systems (IVTS)6 refer 
to any system, mechanism or network of 
people that receives money for the purpose 
of making the funds or an equivalent 
value payable to a third party in another 
geographic location, whether or not in the 
same form. The transfers generally take place 
outside of the conventional banking system 
through non-bank financial institutions or 
other business entities whose primary 
business activity may not be the transmission 
of money7. These transactions take place 
outside of the traditionally regulated 
financial channels. Migrants and diaspora 
communities in the EU continue to rely on 
IVTS to send remittances to their country of 
origin. IVTS in the EU are not subject to all 
AML (Anti Money Laundering) regulations 
or due diligence practices, making it hard 
to monitor transactions. With progressively 
stricter AML regulations and CDD put in 
place in mainstream financial institutions, 
the placement of criminal proceeds into 
the banking system is made more difficult. 
Therefore, IVTS are becoming increasingly 
attractive to OCGs. 
5.6. New payment methods
Online payments allow OCGs to quickly 
withdraw proceeds obtained from clients 
and victims via electronic means and 
to transfer them before the offence or 
suspicious transaction can be detected. 
An increased use of pre-paid credit cards 
6 Also referred to as 
Hawala banking.
7 Definition by FinCEN 
Advisory 33, March 
2003.
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for money laundering purposes has been 
detected. 
OCGs can buy virtual currency for legal 
tender from Bitcoin exchangers operating 
on centralised online trading sites or peer-
to-peer (P2P) networks. Typically, customers 
set up and load their Bitcoin wallets using 
various means of payment. There is no limit 
to the amount an exchanger may be willing 
to trade, making this a potential money 
laundering opportunity for illegal proceeds. 
However, this particular modus operandi 
remains rather limited in scope.
5.7. High value goods
A favoured method of THB OCGs to dispose 
of the cash generated by their activities is the 
purchase of high value goods and real estate. 
Although some EU countries have introduced 
cash payment thresholds to tackle this, the 
majority have not. High value goods offer 
OCGs an opportunity to integrate criminal 
funds into the legitimate economy. Some of 
these assets can also be used for business 
development purposes. 
5.8. Real estate
One of the most widely used methods 
of money laundering by THB OCGs is the 
investment of criminal proceeds in real 
estate. In most cases, OCG members or 
their relatives use criminal proceeds to 
buy property or land in their country of 
origin. More complex schemes can involve 
the under or overvaluation of property or 
mortgages. 
6. LINKS WITH OTHER CRIME AREAS
A large majority of THB OCGs are 
polycriminal, involved in more than one 
crime area. The following sections describe 
the criminal activities used by THB OCGs 
to supplement their income or facilitate 
their activities, as well as their use of other 
criminal groups or individuals to support 
their money laundering process. 
6.1. Income from other crime areas
The most common side activity for OCGs is 
fraud, including VAT, MTIC, social benefits 
and identity fraud. These activities can be 
used to support their THB operations (e.g. 
through counterfeiting residency documents 
or working permits), and/or complement 
their profits (e.g. by committing fraud 
or tax evasion). Other criminal activities 
include drug production and trafficking, 
organised property crime, counterfeiting, 
illegal possession and trafficking of weapons, 
and facilitation of illegal immigration. 
When OCGs are involved in several crime 
areas, it becomes more challenging for law 
enforcement to distinguish which activities 
are predicate offences and which are 
supported by THB proceeds. 
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6.2. Use of victims in other criminal 
activities
Evidence suggests an increased diversification 
in the use of THB victims, including children, 
for criminal purposes (e.g. forced begging, 
organised property crime, fraud and drug 
production). In several cases, victims were 
involved in robberies, burglaries, shoplifting 
and pickpocketing. The modus operandi 
of OCGs has also shifted from the direct 
exploitation of victims to activities such as 
identity theft, credit and social welfare fraud.
The most common modus operandi is 
the registration of victims under different 
addresses in the country of exploitation in 
order to abuse the social benefits system. 
Bank accounts are also opened in the name 
of the victim with the employer or trafficker 
as the custodian, allowing them to control the 
account and withdraw the benefit payments. 
Victims may be abandoned or returned to 
their country of origin once the traffickers 
have seized their documents, opened the 
accounts and started the claims process. 
There is also an increase in THB for the 
purpose of forced or sham marriages. 
Member States reported that women from 
Eastern European MS would agree to travel 
to a Western MS to get married with a 
non-EU national for a small remuneration 
ranging from EUR 300 to EUR 2 000 and 
the opportunity to work in the country. 
The OCG conducting the deal would receive 
approximately EUR 10 000 from the ‘grooms’ 
for their facilitation services8. 
7. CRIME RELEVANT FACTORS
7.1. Technology
New technologies offer additional money 
laundering possibilities to OCGs. As 
mentioned previously, pre-paid credit cards 
and online banking allow OCGs to quickly 
transfer proceeds before the offence or 
suspicious transaction are detected. 
7.2. The economic crisis
The resources available to law enforcement 
have been limited as a result of the financial 
crisis, whilst the need for specialised staff, 
tools and training has increased. This lack of 
resources has been highlighted by several 
MS in the context of financial investigations. 
Member States reported that a large 
number of THB financial investigations are 
not prioritised. Instead, arresting traffickers 
and supporting victims are considered more 
pressing and this is where the investigation 
often ends. 
Companies suffering from the economic crisis 
are also more vulnerable to the influence of 
OCGs. Member States have warned that an 
increasing number of companies may be 
willing to facilitate the exploitation of victims 
or the money laundering process.
7.3. Schengen 
The absence of physical border controls 
provides significant opportunities for 
smaller or mid-level OCGs as well as 
individuals to operate in more than one 
country.  The rotation of victims across 
cities and countries not only allows OCGs 
to avoid law enforcement detection, but 
also provides them with the opportunity to 
move proceeds within the EU using victims 
8 There is an intelligence 
gap regarding the 
actual role of the 
‘brokers’ providing these 
intermediary services, 
concerning whether they 
belong to the traffickers’ 
OCGs, if they act only 
as service providers for 
individuals, or if they 
also belong to other 
OCGs .
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who own legitimate travel documents. The 
absence of internal border controls supports 
the low-cost business model of THB groups 
by saving them the costs associated with 
producing counterfeit identify documents.
The free movement of goods and people 
within the Schengen area also facilitates 
the undeclared transport of large amounts 
of cash within the EU from countries of 
exploitation to countries of origin. This 
makes it difficult to trace THB proceeds. As 
described in the previous chapters, cases 
showed victims transiting regularly between 
the country of exploitation and their own 
countries while carrying large amounts of 
cash. The movement of an increased number 
of migrants within the EU has created money 
laundering opportunities, through the use of 
undeclared cross-border cash transports or 
alternative banking systems. 
EU Regulation 1889/20059 introduced 
controls on cash entering or leaving the EU, 
by compelling individuals to declare amounts 
of cash equivalent or superior to EUR 10 
000 when crossing the EU external border. 
However, this does not regulate intra-EU 
cash movements and there is no harmonised 
approach between all EU MS regarding intra-
community cash movements. This lack of 
uniformity may present an opportunity 
which THB OCGs can exploit as part of their 
money laundering operations.
7.4. The 500 euro banknote
Several EU MS have noted that high 
denomination banknotes are used by THB 
OCGs for money laundering purposes. 500 
euro banknotes are particularly attractive to 
criminal groups due to their high value-to-
weight ratio, which enables the transport of 
large amounts of value in small packages. 
9 European Union: 
European Parliament 
and of the Council, 
Regulation (EC) 
1889/2005 of 26 October 
2005 on controls of cash 
entering or leaving the 
Community [2005], 25 
November 2005, OJ L 
309/9.
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8. ANNEX
i THB is defined by the Palermo Protocol (2000) as ‘the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or 
receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of 
deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or 
benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. 
Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual 
exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.’
ii UN General Assembly, Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and 
Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 15 November 2000. 
 
iii European Union: Council of the European Union, Directive 2011/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 5 April 2011 on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims, and 
replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA, 15 April 2011, OJ L. 101/1-101/11. It set up provisions to 
improve coordination and coherence between EU institutions, EU agencies, Member States (MS), third countries 
and international actors in the field of anti-trafficking. The Directive states that ‘the use of seized and confiscated 
instrumentalities and the proceeds from the offences referred to in this Directive to support victims’ assistance 
and protection, including compensation of victims and Union trans-border law enforcement counter-trafficking 
activities should be encouraged.’ Article 7 on seizure and confiscation specifies: ‘Member States shall take the 
necessary measures to ensure that their competent authorities are entitled to seize and confiscate instrumentalities 
and proceeds from the offences referred to in Articles 2 and 3.’
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This is a Europol working document. This publication or its contents do not imply the expression of 
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